17 ideas
11022 | Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
11065 | The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna] |
11023 | The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen] |
11213 | Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen] |
10067 | Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |