7 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |