21 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
23262 | Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling] |
23263 | Politics is driven by power cliques [Grayling] |
23255 | It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed [Grayling] |
23254 | Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions [Grayling] |
23260 | A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions [Grayling] |
23253 | Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital [Grayling] |
23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling] |
23258 | The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice [Grayling] |
23259 | There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions [Grayling] |