12 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |