11 ideas
| 21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 21700 | Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine] |
| 21701 | Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |