96 ideas
| 18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
| 19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
| 18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
| 18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
| 18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
| 18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
| 18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
| 18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
| 18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
| 18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
| 18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
| 18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
| 19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
| 19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
| 18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
| 18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
| 18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
| 18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
| 18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
| 18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
| 18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
| 18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
| 18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
| 18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
| 18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
| 18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
| 18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
| 18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
| 18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
| 18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
| 18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
| 18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
| 18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
| 18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
| 18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
| 18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
| 18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
| 18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
| 18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
| 18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
| 18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
| 18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
| 18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
| 18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
| 19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
| 18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
| 18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
| 18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
| 19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
| 19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
| 19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
| 19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
| 19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
| 19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
| 19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
| 19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
| 19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
| 19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
| 19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
| 19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
| 19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
| 19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
| 19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
| 19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
| 19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
| 19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
| 19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
| 19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
| 19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
| 19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
| 19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
| 19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
| 19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
| 19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
| 19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
| 19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
| 19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
| 19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
| 19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
| 19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
| 19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
| 19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
| 19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
| 19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
| 18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
| 19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
| 19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |