19 ideas
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
| 10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
| 10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
| 9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
| 10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
| 10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
| 10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
| 10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
| 10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |