15 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa] |
19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa] |
19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |