17 ideas
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 16014 | It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 16024 | I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan] |
| 16023 | Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan] |
| 16016 | Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan] |
| 16017 | Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan] |
| 16015 | Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan] |
| 16020 | Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan] |
| 16019 | Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan] |
| 16018 | Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan] |