12 ideas
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |