17 ideas
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
| 12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |