8 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
1655 | If goodness needs true opinion but not knowledge, you can skip the 'examined life' [Vlastos on Plato] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |