15 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |