Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' and 'Transworld Heir Lines'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9390 Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
11970 Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9389 Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
11969 Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11971 The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11973 Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
11972 Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
11967 Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]