7 ideas
19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |