13 ideas
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 10496 | Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not [Ellen] |
| 10497 | In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules [Ellen] |
| 10495 | Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 10498 | Classification is no longer held to be rooted in social institutions [Ellen] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |