Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Boundary Stones of Thought', 'Gravity and Grace (9 extracts)' and 'Phaedo'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


69 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt]
Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt]
A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt]
Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt]
If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato]
If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]