15 ideas
| 18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
| 18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
| 18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
| 18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
| 18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
| 18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
| 18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 9879 | NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |