Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concepts and Counting', 'Seven Quodlibets' and 'Causation'

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23 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham]