14 ideas
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 9540 | A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 9541 | The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 9543 | The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 9544 | A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |