18 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |