11 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |