Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idea for a Universal History', 'Aristotelian commentaries' and 'Value Theory'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
21054 Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
16751 Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
16720 Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
21053 The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
21055 Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant]
21056 The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
21057 The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant]