29 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |