25 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |