20 ideas
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |