Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism' and 'On Relations of Universals and Particulars'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
18261 A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
22275 Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16045 General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
14327 Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13804 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
13805 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13808 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
13806 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13807 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
13809 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
18260 If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]