16 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |