45 ideas
3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA] |
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA] |
3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA] |
3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA] |
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA] |
3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA] |
3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA] |
3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA] |
3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA] |
3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA] |
12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA] |
3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA] |
3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA] |
3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA] |
3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA] |
3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA] |
3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA] |
3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA] |
3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA] |
3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA] |
3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA] |
3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA] |
3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA] |