14 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
15312 | We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
15311 | Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley] |