Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'The Problem of Possibilia' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

9 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
18261 A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
22275 Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
9212 Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
9213 The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
18260 If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]