13 ideas
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
| 14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |