19 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |