Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability' and 'A Theory of Universals'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]