15 ideas
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |