14 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
19155 | Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson] |