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All the ideas for 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals', 'The Metaphysics within Physics' and 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'

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133 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin]
Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin]
If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin]
The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant]
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant]
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant]
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant]
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant]
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham]
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson]
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant]
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant]
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant]
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant]
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant]
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant]
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant]
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant]
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG]
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant]
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie]
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant]
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin]
Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin]
Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin]
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant]
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B]