Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'Conditionals'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]