10 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |