17 ideas
| 9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
| 9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
| 9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
| 9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
| 9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
| 9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |