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All the ideas for 'Triagmos (lost)', 'Definitions' and 'Interview with Philippa Foot'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11223 Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
11215 Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
11225 A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
11227 The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
11224 Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
11226 Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
11221 A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11217 Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11216 If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
11218 Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
11220 Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
11222 The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
23438 Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431 Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
23432 Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
23433 Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
23434 There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
23439 Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435 If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
467 A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion]