Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Arithmetick', 'The Analysis of Matter' and 'Plural Quantification'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]