17 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |