16 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |