Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Bentley', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13152 We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
13151 Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15863 The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8340 I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
13150 The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
12178 That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]