Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Principia Mathematica', 'Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature?' and 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics'

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 5. Reductio ad Absurdum
Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend]
A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend]
The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend]
A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend]
The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend]
In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend]
Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry]
A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton]
Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz]
We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P]
1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton]
2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton]
3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton]
Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton]
Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton]
I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton]
The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin]
Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon]
Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton]
Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton]