Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Bentley', 'works' and 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13152 We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
13151 Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
8249 Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15863 The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8340 I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
13150 The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
12178 That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]