13 ideas
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| 17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
| 1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
| 5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
| 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
| 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
| 7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
| 13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
| 8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
| 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
| 1631 | You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine] |
| 1632 | Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine] |