Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Theory of Communicative Action', 'Abstract Objects' and 'Meaning'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale]
The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]
Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale]
Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale]
If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale]
Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]