Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Theory of Communicative Action', 'Logical Necessity' and 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


34 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]